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I.   QUESTION PRESENTED 
 
Does the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause apply to the 
sentencing phase of a criminal prosecution?  
 
II.   CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AT ISSUE 
 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; 
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.1  
 
III.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Brandon Thomas Betterman failed to appear in court on December 
8, 2011 to face sentencing for felony partner or family member assault 
(PFMA).2 The district court continued his proceedings for an additional 
day, but he still did not appear.3 Instead, he surrendered to the Butte-Silver 
Bow Detention Center on February 9, 2012.4 There, he wrote a letter to 
the district court, admitting he knew of the missed court date, but pleading 
that he missed it because he had no money and no transportation.5 The 
state was unmoved and so brought felony bail-jumping charges against 
him on March 5; ten days later, the court sentenced him for the PFMA 
charges.6 Betterman pled guilty to the bail-jumping charge at his April 19 
arraignment, since he had already admitted to it in his letter.7 That same 
day, the County Attorney moved to designate him a persistent felony 
offender to enhance his sentence, while the Butte-Silver Bow sheriff jailed 
him pending sentencing.8 Betterman filed a Motion in Opposition and 
Motion to Strike on April 27.9 Two months later, on June 28, the district 
                                           
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 






7 Id. at *2–3. 
8 Id. at *3. 
9 Id. 
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court heard the motion and then sent him back to Butte-Silver Bow until 
sentencing.10 Five more months would pass before the court would rule on 
his designation as a persistent felony offender.11  
Additional delays plagued the case, especially the slow Pre-
Sentence Investigation (PSI).12 Shortly after pleading to the bail-jumping 
charge, the court ordered an updated PSI on May 3—deciding to hold the 
sentencing hearing only after the updated PSI completed.13 That updated 
report would not arrive until October 10. Not until two months later, on 
December 28, did the court schedule the sentencing hearing—for January 
17, 2013.14 At this point, eight months had passed since Betterman pled 
guilty to bail-jumping.15  
So on the day of his sentencing hearing, Betterman moved to 
dismiss charges because the delays in sentencing violated his right to a 
speedy trial.16 The State, seeing an opportunity for irony, promptly asked 
for and received additional time to respond—filing its response January 
29, 2013.17 Although the district court still had not held the sentencing 
hearing or heard his motion to dismiss, it did issue a written order ninety 
days later on April 29—denying his motion to dismiss on the merits, and 
relying on the State v. Ariegwe18 to do so.19  
The Kafka novel continued to write itself, however, when the 
Prosecution and Betterman jointly asked the court in March to schedule 
the sentencing hearing—only to have the court respond that it could not 
“‘fast track’ Betterman’s case at this time.”20 Betterman resorted to filing 
an affidavit, explaining that he had been in Butte-Silver Bow Detention 
Center for the past 442 days, receiving poor medical care and suffering 
anxiety and depression because of these delays.21 He pointed out he would 
have been eligible for conditional release at this point had he been 
promptly sentenced and incarcerated at a state Department of Corrections 
facility.22 He listed other grievances as well: in jail, he could not complete 
the mental health counseling required under his PFMA conviction; in jail, 
he could not continue his schooling; and ultimately, he would like to be 
sentenced.23  
The district court did finally hold his sentencing hearing—on June 
27, 2013—nearly seventeen months after he first surrendered to Butte-
                                           






16 Betterman, 342 P.3d at 973. 
17 Id. 
18 167 P.3d 815 (Mont. 2007). 
19 Betterman, 342 P.3d at 973. 
20 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting correspondence received from the district court). 
21 Betterman, 342 P.3d at 973–74. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
22 MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE Vol. 77 
 
Silver Bow.24 But sentenced he was—seven years to Montana State Prison 
for bail-jumping, with four years suspended, running consecutively to his 
five-year sentence for PFMA. Betterman appealed to the Montana 
Supreme Court on the grounds that the delay between his guilty plea and 
sentencing hearing constituted a violation of his right to a speedy trial.25 
Montana practitioners might be forgiven for thinking that Betterman 
would prevail by relying on State v. Mooney,26 where the Court had 
concluded “sentencing was part of trial for purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment and ‘conclusively [held] that the right to speedy trial applies 
through sentencing.’”27  
But the Court instead overruled Mooney, in part because it relied 
on Pollard v. United States28 as a foundation for the opinion.29 When 
Mooney was decided, Pollard was the only Supreme Court case that 
seemed to address on-point whether the Speedy Trial Clause applies to 
sentencing proceedings.30 In Pollard’s dicta, the United States Supreme 
Court assumed “arguendo” that sentencing is part of trial for Sixth 
Amendment purposes. “Arguendo” was not good enough, and the 
Montana Supreme Court denied Betterman’s appeal, prompting him to 
successfully petition the United States Supreme Court for certiorari.31  
 
IV.   ARGUMENTS—TEXT, HISTORY, PRECEDENT AND PURPOSE 
 
A.   Reasoning of the Lower Court 
 
The Montana Supreme Court recognized the issue at hand centers 
on one word: trial.32 Since the Clause plainly states the accused has a right 
to a speedy trial, the necessary determination of the issue then is whether 
sentencing is part of trial, or if it is instead a distinguishable phase of 
prosecution.33 The Court only touched on the plain language distinctions 
between the words, using Black’s Law Dictionary to define both terms; 
Black’s gave obviously different definitions for both trial and 
sentencing.34 But the Court noted too, that the United States Supreme 
                                           
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 972. 
26 137 P.3d 532 (Mont. 2006). 
27 Betterman, 342 P.3d at 975 (quoting Mooney, 137 P.3d at 535). 
28 352 U.S. 354 (1957). 
29 Betterman, 342 P.3d at 975. 
30 Pollard, 352 U.S. at 361. 
31 Betterman, 342 P.3d at 981; Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015). 
32 Betterman, 342 P.3d at 975–76. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 976 (noting Black’s defines “trial” as “the formal judicial examination of evidence and 
determination of legal claims in an adversary proceeding,” but defines “sentencing” as “judgment that 
a court formally pronounces after finding a criminal defendant guilty.” The Court provided emphasis.); 
TRIAL, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); SENTENCING, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 
2014). 
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Court has also distinguished between sentencing and trial.35 The Court 
found the language in Apprendi v. New Jersey36 instructive: “‘After trial 
and conviction are past,’ the defendant is submitted to ‘judgment’ by the 
court—the stage approximating in modern times the imposition of 
sentence.”37 This language derived in part from Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, so the Montana Supreme Court 
recognized that here, the higher Court had acknowledged a demarcation 
point between trial and sentencing, while simultaneously providing a 
convincing historical source that could contextualize the framers’ intent 
when the Clause was drafted.38  
After establishing the historical foundation for separating the 
concepts of trial and sentencing, the Court examined the Clause’s 
purpose.39 The purpose-based analysis proved more facile since the 
Supreme Court had directly addressed it in Barker v. Wingo.40 In Barker, 
the Court identified three interests the Clause was designed to protect: (1) 
prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimize the anxiety and 
concern of the accused; and (3) limit the possibility the defense will be 
impaired.41 Of those three, the Supreme Court singled-out the third as the 
most important since it “skews the fairness of the entire system.”42 With 
those interests in mind, the Montana Supreme Court noted that once the 
accused becomes a convicted facing sentencing, those interests shift, and 
cannot be satisfactorily reconciled.43 The passage of time, bundled with 
the fading memories and locations of witnesses, and the potential loss of 
exculpatory evidence, ceases to be a concern because those things do not 
hinder the convict’s ability to argue for a lenient sentence.44 Neither should 
there be cause for concern over the convict’s anxiety, because the anxiety 
the Clause is meant to protect is the anxiety one faces from a cloud of 
suspicion while presumed innocent.45 Convicts have no presumption of 
innocence since they have been found guilty by the jury.46 In addressing 
oppressive pre-trial incarceration, the Court reasoned that this concern too, 
protects only those who retain the presumption of innocence, but 
                                           
35 Betterman, 342 P.3d at 975–76. 
36 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
37 Betterman, 342 P.3d. at 975–76 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478 n.4 (quoting 4 William 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 368 (1769)). 
38 Betterman, 342 P.3d at 975–76. 
39 Id. at 976. 
40 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
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nonetheless continue to have their liberty constrained.47 Upon conviction 
however, the worry that a wrongly accused individual has been 
incarcerated disappears, and the worry instead turns to satisfaction that 
justice was rightly done.48  
 
B.   Arguments of the Parties Before the Supreme Court  
 
1.  Petitioner Betterman 
 
Petitioner Betterman argues that although the text of the Clause 
incorporates only a right to a speedy trial, the Court has held before that 
other protections of the Sixth Amendment extend through sentencing 
because a prosecution does not truly end until sentencing completes.49 This 
forms the basis of the Petitioner’s contextual argument: that since the 
Court decided in In Re Oliver50 that the public trial right of the Sixth 
Amendment extends to sentencing, it follows necessarily that the speedy 
trial right does also.51 The right to a public trial, and the right to a speedy 
trial are “paired together” and should thus be judged to have the same 
reach through sentencing.52 Betterman supports this argument with a 
survey of historical sources, citing the Assize of Clarendon in 1166, 
Magna Carta, and Edward Coke’s Institutes of the Laws of England.53 
Betterman proffers these sources for the proposition that justice speedily 
achieved was an overarching goal of the common law from feudal times 
and through the founding fathers’ drafting of the Constitution.54 For Coke 
in particular, justice encompassed sentencing and marked the finality of 
criminal proceedings—and it was Coke’s writings, Betterman argues, that 
were most well-known among the founders, and formed the basis of the 
Speedy Trial Clause.55  
In contrast to the Montana Supreme Court and through the lens of 
historical sources, Betterman refuses to see a clear-cut distinction between 
the words trial and sentencing. Instead of relying on modern dictionary 
meanings, Betterman cycles through how the words were commonly 
understood when the Clause was written.56 He avers that in a common law 
historical context, trial was commonly understood broadly to include a 
                                           
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Petitioner’s Brief, Betterman v. Montana, 2016 WL 322583 at *15–17 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2016) (No. 
14-1457). 
50 333 U.S. 257 (1948). 
51 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 49, at 17. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 18–20. 
54 Id. at 18–22. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 24–29. 
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complete judicial examination that terminated only after sentencing 
completed.57 Use of the word “trial” then, even as Blackstone would have 
meant it, was a type of “shorthand” that included all sentencing 
proceedings, from arraignment to sentencing and judgment.58 Betterman 
supports the argument by citing relatively modern Supreme Court 
precedent.59 Apprendi, and its progeny bolster the “historic link” between 
verdict and sentence such that division of responsibilities between judge 
and jury is not dispositive to the issue; rather, it is the solid connection 
between verdict and sentence that compels sentencing to be acknowledged 
as part of trial under the Speedy Trial Clause.60  
In this contextual historical analysis, Betterman argues that a 
reconciliation of the Barker factors is indeed possible when trial 
encompasses sentencing.61 Just like pretrial defendants, those who await 
sentencing suffer undue oppression when they are held in local jails 
lacking fundamental resources often allocated instead to long-term 
correctional facilities.62 These local jails usually have no recreational and 
rehabilitative programs, and thus discount the dignity of the individual 
incarcerated while undermining the basic and desirable penological goal 
of rehabilitation.63 Betterman’s argument on the impairment of defense—
identified as the most important of theBarker factors—centers on the fact 
that in the modern criminal justice system, most charges are resolved with 
a guilty plea, not trials.64 This means that a delay in sentencing encumbers 
the sentencing defense which, under the modern regime, is often the only 
time that facts are actually adjudicated in court.65 As an example, 
Betterman notes that defendants are allowed to procure witnesses to testify 
on their behalf for a lower sentence; without speedy sentencing, witness 
memories fade, and witnesses themselves may become unavailable, just 
as at trial.66 Betterman further argues that under the last of the Barker 
factors, anxiety and concern, a convict differs little if at all from his 
accused counterpart. Again, under the modern criminal justice system, the 
complexity and range of a sentence to be imposed varies so widely, that 
one who awaits sentencing may well suffer greater anxiety and concern 
than one who is merely accused.67  
 
                                           
57 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 49, at 26–27. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 30. 
60 Id. (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479–82). 
61 Id. at 34–36. 
62 Id. at 35. 
63 Id. at 36. 
64 Id. at 41–44. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 42–43. 
67 Id. at 45. 
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2.  Respondent State of Montana 
 
The State of Montana counters Betterman’s arguments with a 
purpose-driven analysis.68 Montana tackles first Betterman’s contextual 
argument: that since other rights in the Sixth Amendment have been 
extended by the Court through sentencing, then the Speedy Trial right 
must likewise follow. To counter that argument, Montana postulates that 
although the rights are textually linked, they serve different purposes, and 
it is those distinct purposes that must control and deny the right’s extension 
through sentencing.69 To illustrate the point, Montana argues that the right 
to a trial by an impartial jury is similarly linked to the speedy trial right, 
but that the Court has never used the Petitioner’s logic to identify a 
concomitant right to jury sentencing.70 Instead, the Court has chosen to 
distinguish between the jury’s role of fact-finding and the judge’s role of 
imposing judgment and sentencing.71 Montana makes another significant 
distinction by identifying a temporal disparity in the right to a public trial 
and the right to a speedy trial—the right to a public trial logically applies 
during trial proceedings, but the right to a speedy trial does not actually 
apply to trial proceedings at all; instead, the speedy trial right attaches to 
the delay before trial proceedings begin.72 Thus, the speedy trial right and 
public trial right are temporally disjointed, rendering the textual linkage 
identified by Betterman inapposite.  
Montana adds that a historical analysis aids in identifying the 
intended purpose of the speedy trial right, and supports the narrower 
reading that it would not apply through sentencing.73 To make this 
assertion, Montana uses many of the same historical sources as Betterman: 
Blackstone, Magna Carta, and Coke.74 Montana assures the Court these 
historical sources show that semi-feudal notions of speedy justice pertain 
only to the accused’s right to be “release[d] from any unwarranted 
restraints on his liberty [and] to the government’s obligation to bring the 
accused ‘speedily . . . to his trial.’”75 When those texts speak of “justice” 
then, the commonly understood meaning would be trial proceedings, not 
sentencing.76 Additionally, the State notes that even if “justice” in these 
texts did extend the notion of trial through sentencing, the drafters of the 
Constitution, doubtlessly aware of the idea, deliberately chose not to 
                                           
68 Respondent’s Brief, Betterman v. Montana, 2016 WL 704819 at *17 (U.S. Feb. 18, 2016) (No. 14-
1457). 
69 Id. at 18. 
70 Id. at 19. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 20–24. 
74 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 68, at 20–22. 
75 Id. at 21. 
76 Id. at 22–23. 
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include a guarantee of “speedy justice.”77 Instead, the phrase they chose is 
“speedy trial”—and the phrase should be respected and read “to mean 
exactly what it appears to say . . . trial without undue delay.”78  
The State takes a moment to use these historical sources to make 
one additional contextual point—that the right belongs to the “accused” 
and not the “convicted” is no accident.79 When the Bill of Rights was 
drafted, the founders were doubtlessly aware that Blackstone had made a 
distinction between those “accused” and those “convicted.”80 The Speedy 
Trial Clause would therefore have been understood to afford the right only 
to those who had not yet been convicted.81 This then aligns perfectly with 
the intent in similar provisions “dating back to Magna Carta”: to protect 
the accused from the anxiety and concern that accompanies public 
accusation.82  
The logically following purpose of the Speedy Trial Clause is to 
safeguard the rights of only the accused, by avoiding their prolonged 
detention, and mitigating the stressful consequences of accusation while 
awaiting a fair trial to determine guilt or innocence.83 Within this 
framework, Montana examines the first of the Barker factors, and argues 
that one who is convicted does not suffer undue and oppressive 
incarceration by awaiting sentencing in jail because his incarceration is 
rightly due to him by virtue of his conviction.84 That a prison has better 
amenities than a jail is of no matter because differences in penal 
institutions are not a basis for constitutional challenge under Meachum v. 
Fano.85 Montana further contends that even if Betterman’s penological 
differences argument had merit, it is at best speculative and subjective, 
requiring a ranking of prison and jail facilities that would be impossible 
because the modern truth is that every one of those facilities is 
underfunded and overcrowded.86  
Montana next addresses the anxiety and concern factor from 
Barker. Montana adopts the Montana Supreme Court argument that the 
anxiety and concern Barker meant to protect was only pre-trial anxiety 
and concern.87 Pre-trial anxiety is grounded in the presumption of 
innocence, and oppresses the will of those facing the machinations of the 
                                           
77 Id. at 23. 
78 Id. at 24 (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. at 307, 314, n.6 (1971)). 
79 Id. at 27. 
80 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 68, at 28. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 29. 
84 Id. at 30–31. 
85 Id. at 32; 427 U.S. 215, 225, 228 (1976). 
86 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 68, at 32–33. 
87 Id. at 39–40. 
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justice system.88 Pre-trial concerns differ substantially from those arising 
post-conviction because “[o]nce a defendant is convicted, he is not merely 
accused, ‘living under a cloud of suspicion’—the suspicion has been 
confirmed and any ignominy that flows from that is deserved.”89 Pre-trial 
anxiety is thus an “objective reality,” whereas post-conviction anxiety is 
largely fabricated by those seeking to minimize the impact of their future 
incarceration and punishment.90  
Montana counters the most important of the Barker factors, the 
impairment of the defense, by undermining the Petitioner’s argument that 
sentencing hearings are, in effect, “mini-trials,” necessitating coverage by 
the Speedy Trial Clause.91 To do so, Montana distinguished sentencing 
hearings from fact-finding trials: in reality, few witnesses are ever called; 
no evidence is presented except for the pre-sentence investigation report; 
and because the parties have come to an agreement on the sentence to be 
imposed, it is improbable that any factual issues will require resolution. 
But ultimately, the purpose between sentencing hearings and trials is 
fundamentally different—a trial is designed to determine the narrow issue 
of guilt, and a sentencing hearing is a broader matter, meant to impose a 
wide range of possible sentences by a judge wielding considerable 
discretion.92  
 
V.   ANALYSIS 
 
Because the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to a speedy trial, 
Betterman must convince the Court that trial concomitantly means both 
fact-finding and sentencing. History and precedent are obstacles for the 
Petitioner. Betterman grounds his historical argument in feudal notions of 
speedily-served Justice. Justice, under the texts he cites, encompasses both 
trial and sentencing, essentially conflating the two concepts into a single 
ideal subsequently incorporated into the Constitution as the Speedy Trial 
Clause. The problem with that argument, as the State noted, is two-fold. 
First, if the word Justice encompassed both trial and sentencing at the time 
of drafting, then the drafters could have chosen to use “justice” in lieu of 
“trial.” But they did not. If trial is a subpart of Justice as the Petitioner 
argues, then the articulation by the drafters of that subpart alone may be 
seen by the Court as a rejection of the broader notion. Expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius.93 The fact that the drafters had available to them these 
                                           
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 40. 
90 Id. at 40–41. 
91 Id. at 41–42. 
92 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 68, at 43–45. 
93 A canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the 
other, or of the alternative. EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
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texts that talked of speedy justice, but chose instead to draft a speedy trial 
clause, weighs in favor of the state.  
Second, prior Supreme Court rulings acknowledge a distinction 
between trial and sentencing. As the Montana Supreme Court noted, 
Pollard seemed to address directly whether sentencing is part of trial for 
the purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Although that Court originally saw 
Pollard as a supporting authority for equating the two in Mooney, Pollard 
is arguably more persuasive for an opposite finding. Because Pollard 
assumed arguendo that sentencing was a part of trial for Sixth Amendment 
purposes, the meaning of arguendo is important. The word connotes a 
hypothetical posited purely for the sake of argument. A hypothetical 
employs a fiction to demonstrate a point. Thus, it requires accepting as 
true, a concept not before acknowledged as such. The fiction accepted as 
true in Pollard is that sentencing is part of trial. Pollard thus establishes 
the notion as a fiction. This shifts the weight of authority prior to Pollard 
in favor of the State as well—before Pollard, the Court had not 
acknowledged sentencing to be a part of trial, and was doing so in Pollard, 
only for the sake of illustrating an argument. The Court might thus view 
the conflation of sentencing with trial as no less fictive today as when 
Pollard was decided.  
While Pollard arguably supports the notion the Court has not 
before seen trial concomitant with sentencing, other decisions subsequent 
to Pollard reject the notion in dicta. For instance, Betterman cites 
Apprendi for the proposition that verdict and sentence are indissoluble, 
and therefore support treating sentencing as part of trial; however, in 
Apprendi, the Court explained that a trial is commonly understood to be a 
fact-finding endeavor before a jury of one’s peers, but that sentencing 
naturally follows the verdict of the juryafter the trial.94 Other cases 
similarly erode Betterman’s position. In Doggett v. United States,95 the 
Court noted that the “right of the accused to a speedy trial has no 
application beyond the confines a formal criminal prosecution.”96 After a 
conviction at trial, the accused becomes the convicted as Montana argued. 
Once that occurs, the penological interest shifts and there is no longer a 
formal, criminal prosecution—instead there is an interest of the state in 
post-conviction penological goals: rehabilitation, retribution, deterrence, 
community safety, or a combination thereof. But formal prosecution is not 
among the pursuits of the state post-conviction. The Court remarked too, 
in United States v. Loud Hawk,97 that the “Speedy Trial Clause’s core 
concern is the impairment of liberty.”98 This mirrors the State’s argument 
                                           
94 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477–79. 
95 505 U.S. 647 (1992). 
96 Id. at 662. 
97 474 U.S. 302 (1986). 
98 Id. at 312. 
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under the Barker factors that oppressive incarceration is practically an 
impossibility for one who is no longer accused, but convicted. 
Incarceration of the convicted is a legal and societal expectation, not an 
aberrance in need of correction. A convicted thus rightly awaits sentencing 
in jail and his impairment of liberty is not wrongful as it would be for an 
accused later to be found innocent—the obvious concern of Loud Hawk.  
Other Barker factors burden the Petitioner as well. Since the 
Barker factors were written with pre-trial concerns in mind, the Petitioner 
is tasked with forcing a fit for each factor into concerns arising after 
conviction—a full two stages (trial, and post-conviction) after the pre-trial 
stage the Barker factors were meant to cover. The safeguarding of the 
accused’s ability to present a defense is a good example. In order for this 
factor to apply neatly, the Court must buy into Betterman’s assertion that 
sentencing hearings are not hearings at all, but as the State labels them—
“mini-trials.” To sell that buy-in, Betterman is again relying on the 
proposition that there are not in fact these disjointed stages, but an overall, 
cohesive concept of Justice that includes pre-trial, trial, and post-
conviction concerns. If the Court cannot find traction with the Petitioner’s 
historical argument supporting this theory of cohesion, then Betterman’s 
Barker arguments have little to stand on.  
By contrast, Betterman’s strongest argument is contextual. The 
contextual argument grounds the potential expansion of the right in both 
precedent and text of the Amendment itself. The Court may see an 
argument rooted in precedent and text as the toehold it needs to expand the 
Speedy Trial Clause to sentencing, just as it ostensibly did with the Public 
Trial clause in Oliver. But whether the Court has in fact extended the 
Public Trial right to cover sentencing is a threshold issue for Betterman if 
this argument is to have merit. If Betterman misread Oliver, or the Court 
finds it distinguishable, then the argument has little foundation. Betterman 
is not helped by the fact that the State makes a compelling point by seizing 
on the right to a jury trial, and noting that it has not been extended through 
sentencing, even though it is textually similarly situated. This will likely 
be a key issue for the Court to probe at oral argument.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
